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Abstract 
As intellectual property chapters are now regularly part of free trade agreements, countries need to 
have a clear view of what elements of a patent system will encourage domestic innovation and what 
elements will simply raise the cost of goods and services. Drawing on the range of empirical material 
available about patent systems, this paper presents an initial analysis of critical design elements to 
maximise economic welfare while implementing patent policy in developing and technology-importing 
economies. Key issues considered are: patent policy objectives; limitations to patentable subject 
matter; the height of the inventive step; the privileges provided by patents; incentives, penalties and 
strategic gaming; and transparency issues particularly oversight, evaluation and audit. Development of 
a set of policy principles which align with maximising national economic well-being goes some way to 
meeting the goals of the Development Agenda Group put forward in the context of WIPO's Committee 
on Development and Intellectual Property. Such a set of principles would also play a useful role is 
assessing the value of patents in trading for improved market access for goods and services thus 
assisting an evidence-based approach to trade negotiations.  
 
1 
Tailoring patent policy for developing economies 
1. Introduction 
Since the Uruguay Round most "free trade" agreements – whether multi-lateral, regional or bilateral – 
have included the government-backed monopolies known as "intellectual property rights". They cover 
patents, copyrights, trademarks and a variety of other restraints on competition. The draft Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), adopted as a requirement for 
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, was put forward by the business sector (Drahos 2002; Sell 
2003). The more recent agreements usually include a TRIPS-plus agenda – more extensive restraints on 
trade than those included in TRIPS (Drahos 2001, 2007a; Sell 2011).1  
These negotiations take place in great secrecy. Parties to the current negotiations on the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPPA) have undertaken not to disclose copies of the draft text. It is not clear 
who proposed this secrecy nor why participants agreed, as all participating nations are democracies.2 A 
secret text makes it impossible for governments to undertake the kind of consultations about major 
changes to policy that are expected in a democracy. The available leaked draft of the TPPA "intellectual 
property" chapter suggests that such draft treaties continue to be written by major global companies.3 
This secrecy makes it essential that civil society and democratic governments develop their own agenda 
for such legislated monopolies. This paper sets out an alternative agenda on patents.  
The patent arena can be as contentious domestically as it is in international forums. Perhaps the most 
trenchant criticisms come from the USA, a technology-exporting nation (e.g. Jaffe and Lerner 2004; 
Quillen Jr. 2006; Bessen and Meurer 2008; Boldrin and Levine 2008). Yet these concerns have not led 
Congress to rebalance the US patent system nor the agenda pursued in international "trade" 
negotiations.4 Those favouring the business model embedded in TRIPS and post-TRIPS proposals do not 
base their proposals on any evidence about their effectiveness in inducing innovation. 
But there is substantial empirical evidence that can be used to inform patent policy.5 This paper draws on 
that evidence to put forward some initial proposals for an agenda for patent policy designed to 
encourage domestic innovating firms without incurring the large deadweight losses of the current 
system. These goals are critical to developing economies, which usually import technology. Indeed they 
would suit any nation better than the TRIPS system. The proposals cover patent policy objectives; 
limitations to patentable subject matter; the height of the inventive step; the privileges provided by 
                                                          
1
 The one exception is the 2001 Doha Agreement. This Ministerial Declaration affirms that "the TRIPS Agreement 
does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health" 
(http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en/).  
2
 Interestingly neither the US Trade Representative website (http://www.ustr.gov/tpp) nor the official Australian 
website (http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/) mention this. But see sites such as http://keionline.org/node/1362; 
http://www.citizen.org/TPP; and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Pacific_Strategic_Economic_Partnership.  
3 Article 8(1) proposes, inter alia, that "a new form, use, or method of using a known product may satisfy the 
criteria for patentability, even if such invention does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that 
product" (emphasis added). The focus on efficacy indicates the origin as the pharmaceutical industry. The leaked 
intellectual property chapter is at http://keepthewebopen.com/assets/pdfs/TPP%20IP%20Chapter%20Proposal.pdf. 
4
 There was a brief hesitation in 2007 when the US Congress removed "tough public health provisions" from 
bilateral trade treaties. Provisions about data exclusivity, patent extensions and patent linkage were removed from 
Free Trade Agreements with Colombia, Peru and Panama (Sell 2011: 449). Subsequent bilateral or regional treaties 
have returned to the agenda which preferences pharmaceutical profits over the Doha Declaration.  
5
 To a lesser extent there are some empirical data on the impact of copyright, in particular on the extent to which 
copyrights benefit publishers compared to authors. Towse and colleagues (2008) find that empirical progress lags 
theoretical progress. There are however some data on UK and German author earnings (Kretschmer and Hardwick 
2007) and on economic returns to Australian artists (Throsby and Zednik 2010). In the trademarks area there is as 
yet very little empirical data on how trademarks are used or their impact (see Greenhalgh and Rogers 2007).  
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patents; incentives, penalties and strategic gaming; and transparency issues particularly oversight, 
evaluation and audit. These are put forward as policy principles. Once developed and agreed they can be 
translated into appropriate treaty language.  
2. Some issues about assumptions and perspectives 
There are some disciplinary tensions in discussions about patent policy. Although the objectives of 
patent policy are economic, lawyers have long claimed the field within academia. Effective reform 
requires input from both economists and lawyers as this important economic policy is delivered through 
the legal system. But both disciplines address patent policy with embedded assumptions. For good 
evidence-based policy these assumptions need to be identified and tested against empirical reality.  
The essence of patent policy is the incentive to change investment behaviour. Because of this the normal 
rules of law (for criminal behaviour or contracts over physical property) will not always deliver good 
outcomes. Similarly economic theories are based on inaccurate assumptions will be a poor guide to 
effective policy.  
An example of the need to challenge "automatic" legal presumptions is the onus of proof. In economics 
the dangers of regulatory intervention in markets are well-known and so clear evidence of a net increase 
in welfare is required to justify the intervention. In addition the cost of the intervention must be less 
than that of any alternative means of achieving the goals. If these two criteria cannot be achieved, then a 
country will be worse off for adopting the intervention. "Clear evidence" aligns with the legal standard 
"beyond reasonable doubt." But lawyers are reluctant to use this standard outside criminal law. But a 
granted patent provides a powerful exclusive right that can impact strongly on firms which have not 
been a party to the decision to grant a monopoly. The patent privilege is the right to prevent others from 
commercially exploiting a particular area of technology.6 A very high standard of proof is therefore 
indicated.  
An example of the need to challenge economic assumptions is the frequent assumption that copying 
new knowledge is costless and so there will be no incentive for any invention or industrial innovation 
without patents. As Bonatti and Comino (2011) show, if imitation takes time – demonstrated empirically 
by Mansfield and reinforced by data from the Yale survey7 – then social welfare is higher without 
patents, particularly where there are R&D subsidies. Theoretical economic analyses of "optimal" patent 
design tend to focus on issues of duration versus breadth. Yet the former has a fixed minimum under 
TRIPS and "breadth" is not a concept that aligns well with practical patent administration. Patent systems 
need to be designed on the basis of a sound understanding of their practical effect. One cannot, for 
example, simply assume inventiveness (as is shown in Section 5).  
It is also important to bear in mind that the major benefits from trade agreements arise from domestic 
reform (Armstrong 2012: 1641). It is the dismantling of barriers to competition that delivers the greatest 
economic benefit – a benefit spread throughout the economy. Consumers benefit directly from lower 
tariff barriers. So too do firms who can then reduce input prices and compete more effectively both at 
home and overseas. Increased access to overseas markets provides only a small part of the benefits from 
trade, and these benefits are often concentrated.  
In contrast to the pro-competition agenda of free trade, patents are designed to restrain competition. If 
they do not have this effect, they cannot work to increase investment in R&D. Patent systems run 
directly counter to competition agendas and sit poorly in the context of "free trade". However the 
principles of the free trade agenda apply to the extent that the greatest domestic benefits will be from 
reform of patents to maximise the impact on domestic innovation and minimise the deadweight costs of 
restraints on competition. 
                                                          
6
 As Quillen has said, the critical issue for proceeding with an innovation is the soundness of the innovation and 
whether it is impeded by others' patents, not whether you own patents on it (Quillen Jr. 2008: 61). 
7
 See Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) and Levin et al. (1987). 
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3. Patent policy objectives 
In its essence patent policy is a simple trade-off between the goals of fostering industrially applied 
domestic innovation and the costs of reduced competition. The traditional argument for patent policy is 
that firms undertaking industrial innovation have insufficient exclusive time in the market to recoup their 
development costs if competition is unrestrained. Patents, by granting an exclusive period in the market, 
overcome this problem and should thus induce resources to move into industrial research and 
development (R&D) which in turn should increase the level of commercialised industrial innovation.  
This dynamic efficiency benefit comes at the cost of suppressing competition during the patent period, 
causing static efficiency losses. Design of an effective and efficient patent system centres on this trade-
off between dynamic efficiency gains and static efficiency losses. If gains can be maximised and losses 
minimised, then a patent system can provide a net economic benefit for an economy. The principles 
developed in this paper are directed to achieving such welfare-enhancing balance in a patent system.  
Unfortunately these objectives of patent policy are rarely mentioned in national patent legislation. 
However in the TRIPS Agreement the objectives are spelled out:  
"The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the 
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the 
mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations."  (TRIPS, Article 7) 
Article 7 thus provides a clear articulation of the principle goal of patent policy – to encourage 
technological innovation.  
A policy is not efficient if it rewards behaviours that would occur absent the policy. Such waste simple 
provides unearned benefits (windfall gains) to some parties. Given the strong exclusionary right of a 
patent – the right to prevent independent invention – providing patents for innovation that would have 
taken place anyway has an extremely high cost. As Bessen and Meurer (2008) have pointed out, those 
who face patent infringement challenges are other innovating firms. So the patent goal needs to be 
refined to: 
Encourage technological innovation that would not otherwise take place. 
As well as encouraging technological innovation, TRIPS Article 7 indicates clearly that patent systems 
should ensure benefits to users as well as producers of new technology. This perspective has a sound 
economic basis. The reason that possible failure in the innovation market attracts government 
intervention is the anticipated spillover benefits from the induced innovation. If an induced innovation 
does not provide social benefits8 that are greater than the costs of the restraint on competition, then 
grant of a patent would impose costs on society rather than providing benefits. As clarified in the recent 
Indian Supreme Court decision, the purpose of a patent system is to benefit the nation not to reward 
individual inventors.9 Private returns are not the issue here. Where private returns to innovation are 
high, patents are not needed to induce the innovation. Only where private returns are low are patents 
needed, but they are efficient only if spillover benefits are high enough to offset the associated static 
efficiency losses. This indicates a second important requirement that should be set forward as a key 
policy objective.  
Encourage technological innovation that would not otherwise take place  
and  
whose spillover benefits are greater than the cost of the restraint on competition. 
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 Social benefits are private benefits plus positive externalities such as spillovers from new knowledge; social costs 
are private costs plus negative externalities, such as the suppression of competition and reduced consumer welfare. 
9
 "Patent systems are not created in the interest of the inventor but in the interest of national economy. The rules 
and regulations of the patent systems are not governed by civil or common law but by political economy." Cited in 
Novatis AG v Union of India and others, Civil Appeal Nos. 2706-2716 of 2013, Supreme Court of India at 36. 
4 
This is a more detailed specification of the "mutual advantage of producers and users" phrase of TRIPS 
Article 7, but specified in terms of the underlying economics.  
Of course there are substantial real-world challenges in implementing such a policy goal. But unless goals 
are clear and agreed there is little point developing implementation measures. To date the height of the 
inventive step has been used as the major (but unstated) proxy for benefits exceeding costs. This would 
be one means of implementing this policy goal and is addressed in Section 5. 
Both these policy goals raise the question of how technological innovation should be defined (Section 4), 
but are otherwise unexceptional. Those less familiar with the actual practices of patent systems may 
wonder why such simple statements are needed.  
The goal of inducing technological innovation that would not otherwise take place is quite 
straightforward in policy (if not in political)10 terms. But the use of the inventive step to ensure that the 
benefits should exceed the costs seems to require discussion. There is a wide gulf between legal and 
economic views as to what is the quid pro quo to the nation for the monopoly grant which is the essence 
of a patent. From an economic perspective the economic basis for intervening in the innovation market 
is the view that the social returns from innovation are substantially greater than the private returns. If 
the spillover benefits from the patented technology are high enough, then patent grant is rational and 
the nation is better off. For a patent system to provide a net benefit to a nation there needs to be a 
strong likelihood that each granted patent provides social benefits greater than the social costs.  
What is a reasonable proxy for spillover benefits from an invention? Mansfield's much-quoted study on 
social returns is based on gross consumer surplus from 17 innovations (Mansfield et al. 1977). Only six of 
these had both a high gross social return and a low private return, thus needing a patent or other 
incentive. Consumer surplus is difficult to measure and the relevant policy standard is not gross 
consumer surplus from the invention (the Mansfield metric) but net consumer surplus from the 
invention and the products displaced by it. Net consumer surplus would generally be a highly 
impracticable approach from an administrative viewpoint. In the specific case of inventions such as 
pharmaceuticals, consumer benefit can be more readily proxied as an improved health outcome. If these 
improved health outcomes – compared to other treatments available – exceed the cost of the restraint 
on competition, then there is a sound basis for the patent grant. 
The other major recognised form of external benefit from innovation is new knowledge – indeed the 
standard economic argument for patents is that new knowledge is costlessly and immediately copyable. 
Knowledge spillovers can flow along a number of pathways to other firms and innovators. Their 
magnitude is variable and contingent.11 Both technological and geographic proximity are important 
variables for spillovers to occur and this raises issues of whether spillovers can be assumed to exist if 
either distance is large. A large technological distance may exist between patents granted to leading-
edge foreign firms and domestic firms in a country in the earlier stages of development. In many cases 
granting patents for products which are imported raises substantial doubt as to the existence of positive 
spillovers in the patent-granting country. These issues are discussed further in Section 6.  
Setting aside for the moment the questions as to whether positive spillovers from new knowledge can 
always be assumed to exist, the extent of new knowledge contributed might be a practical and workable 
way of specifying the benefit to the community that is expected when a patent monopoly is granted. It 
also aligns well with the social contract theory of patents. 
Legal commentators often suggest that the quid pro quo for grant of a patent is the disclosure of the 
invention in the specification (Ghosh 2004: 1315). But if the patented invention contains no new 
knowledge, no amount of disclosure can create a benefit for the public. Disclosure is thus a means 
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 Some in the patent community consider that patents are a right rather than a societally-approved privilege (and 
that this right exists regardless of whether the R&D would have been undertaken absent patent policy).  
11
 Sena discusses the variety of channels through which knowledge spillovers flow (Sena 2004: 318); Jaffe (Jaffe 
1986, 1988) and Porter (1990) demonstrate the importance of technological or geographic proximity; and Bernstein 
and Nadiri (1991) show there are substantial differences between industries in the magnitude of such spillovers.  
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through which new knowledge might flow – though as many familiar with the patent system argue, not a 
very efficient means. Effectively disclosure is a condition of the grant, but it is not the reason for making 
the grant and it does not constitute a benefit to the public unless what is disclosed is of some value.  
Some argue that without patents many inventions would be kept secret. This is not an argument that 
holds water from an economic perspective. Boldrin and Levine (2013: 9-10) cogently argue, as others 
have done before them, that it would be irrational to patent an invention that can be kept secret. The 
history of innovation shows that inventors and innovators exchange ideas as a matter of course and that 
secrecy, where it occurs, normally only occurs in the last stages of commercialisation.  
The two objectives of patent policy can be drawn out to incorporate the economic (or social contract) 
view of the quid pro quo:  
"to encourage technological innovations which would not otherwise occur and  
which provide sufficient new knowledge, know-how or net consumer benefit 
to the community  
to offset the costs of the monopoly to innovating firms and the community." 
4. Limitation to technological innovations 
The language of TRIPS Article 7 introduces a critical aspect of patent policy – one that has been so 
fundamental that it is rarely spelled out.12 This is that the patent system is designed only for 
technological innovations. The reasons for this centre on the experimentation (and hence cost) required 
to develop new technological artefacts. It is these lumpy costs which underlie the view that time in the 
market can be too short to ensure an adequate return to the R&D investment. In contrast, in other parts 
of an economy, such as business methods, the R&D phase can frequently be limited to the idea itself. 
Implementation usually incurs only production costs not R&D costs, so the argument that early 
competitors will undermine returns to R&D does not withstand scrutiny. Given that it always takes 
competitors some time to deliver their version of the product to the market,13 where R&D costs are low 
or there are network effects, first-mover advantages can be considerable and will usually be sufficient to 
induce the innovation without the need for a patent monopoly.  
The theoretically optimal standard for what should be granted patents ─ only "inventions that need the 
patent incentive" (Duffy 2008: 344) ─ is impossible to administer. But it does draw attention to a very 
important policy issue – not all inventions should be patentable. Empirical and theoretical analyses show 
that those inventions which may not occur absent patents are those where the initial period of market 
exclusivity is too short to recoup research and development (R&D) costs.14 This will typically be discrete 
product inventions which are highly codified and can therefore be imitated more quickly. The most 
obvious policy conclusion from this range of empirical evidence is that innovations should be patentable 
only in selected technologies/industries. This first-best option is precluded by TRIPS which mandates no 
discrimination between technologies.  
While this preferred option cannot therefore be adopted, it does suggest the need for careful design of 
other policy elements to minimise the damage done by the technology-neutral TRIPS mandate. There is, 
for example, substantial evidence that chemical and pharmaceutical innovation proceeds faster if 
compounds are unpatentable, but processes can be patented. After reviewing the impact of the 
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 Assumptions that are fundamental to agreed views on how society does and should work are so generally shared 
that they are rarely mentioned (Hirschman 1977: 69). When there is a paradigm shift – such as the inclusion of 
legislated monopolies in "free trade" agreements – there is often an accompanying shift in underlying assumptions.  
13
 The original empirical research demonstrating the costs and time required for copying was undertaken by 
Mansfield and colleagues (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner 1981). Their results were replicated in the larger Yale 
survey (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter 1987).  
14
 Key theoretical analyses are Arrow 1962, Boldrin and Levine 2004 and Bonatti and Comino 2011. The major 
empirical analyses are well summarized in López 2009. For a much fuller discussion of this argument, and the range 
of relevant evidence see Moir 2013b Chapter 2.  
6 
patenting of compounds on the British and French chemical industries in the late nineteenth century, the 
new German Federation chose to provide patents for chemical processes but not compounds – as a 
result it quickly achieved global dominance in chemical production (Dutfield 2003, Chapter 4). The Italian 
adoption of patents for compounds led to the demise of its globally competitive generic pharmaceutical 
industry with no improvement in its capacity to produce new chemical compounds (Scherer and 
Weisburst 1995). Against this background it would seem sensible – at least in respect of chemical 
compositions – to limit patent grant as far as possible. Given TRIPS, this must be done indirectly – by 
requiring substantial inventiveness before grant of a patent (see Section 5). This second-best option 
would also reduce the volume of pharmaceutical patenting and the extent of evergreening.15  
The first-best option for a focused and efficient patent system is  
to limit patent grant to highly codified inventions with large lumpy R&D costs.  
This first-best option is denied by TRIPS. 
The technological neutrality clause (Article 27(1)) is perhaps the most damaging feature of TRIPS, when 
considering the design of efficient and effective patent policy. A first step in overcoming the damage 
caused by this clause would be to limit patentability to technological innovations. At the time TRIPS was 
agreed, it was clearly understood that software was not patentable subject matter (New Zealand 
Ministry of Economic Development 2002). TRIPS specifies that copyright is to be provided for software 
(Article 10). TRIPS also allows exclusion from patentability for protection of "human animal or plant life 
or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment" (Article 27(2)); diagnostic, therapeutic and 
surgical methods for treating humans or animals; and plants and animals other than micro-organisms 
(Article 27(3)). Such exclusions were prevalent when TRIPS was negotiated – indeed most countries did 
not – or had not until recently – allowed patents for chemical and pharmaceutical products. There is no 
evidence that providing patents for these subject matters increases the rate of invention.  
A third issue in what can be patented (patentable subject matter) revolves around the distinction 
between a discovery and an invention. There are good economic and policy reasons why discoveries are 
not patentable – and there is widespread agreement that newly discovered knowledge about the laws of 
nature should be available for all to use. But inventions based on the application of these new 
discoveries are patentable. Such inventions usually require experimentation and can be costly to 
develop. Over the past 30 years there have been rapid developments in understanding genetics. A 
number of countries have and do grant patents over genes, gene fragments, proteins and related aspects 
of how genes work. These are clearly discoveries and should remain in the public domain. The approach 
of some patent offices (for example in Australia, Europe and the USA) that the "isolation and 
purification" of genetic information constitutes an invention undermines patent policy. Recently the US 
Supreme Court has corrected the US Patent Office and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(CAFC) advising that patents cannot cover pure genetic information. Although this decision has its 
limitations, it does undermine the "isolated and purified" doctrine that so many countries, including 
Australia, adopted to justify granting patents for gene sequences.16   
Limiting patentability to technological innovations will go some way towards focusing on those 
innovations where large lumpy R&D costs do actually lead to market failure, without contravening TRIPS. 
Further, maximising the use of these "TRIPS flexibilities" will ensure that patents are not granted where 
they are not needed. These flexibilities include excluding all software from patentability as well as 
methods of medical treatment.  
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 The process of taking out a number of secondary patents to extend the patent life of a major new compound. 
These secondary patents take the form of variations in the compound (such as salts, esters and metabolites); 
alternative methods of delivery (tablets and capsules; delayed, extended or normal release); different treatments 
etc (Moir and Palombi 2013).  
16
 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013). The decision, however goes 
on to say that complementary DNA (cDNA) can be patented. There are a variety of well-known methods of making 
cDNA. Any cDNA with the functionality of an existing gene is not genuinely new and should not pass the patent 
tests of novelty and inventiveness. If cDNA were not identical, diagnostic tests based on cDNA would not work.  
7 
Patents were historically limited to technological inventions, but patent statutes rarely specify this. 
Germany, which undertook substantial research before designing its patent laws, has a fundamental, but 
unwritten, limitation to technology. Bakels notes that the limitation to technical inventions was always 
considered a rule of customary law (Bakels 2012: 42). This viewpoint is clearly stated in a 1976 decision 
by the German Federal Court of Justice: 
"The patent system is also not conceived as a reception basin, in which all otherwise not legally 
privileged mental achievements should find protection. It was on the contrary conceived as a 
special law for the protection of a delimited sphere of mental achievements, namely the technical 
ones, and it has always been understood and applied in this way." 17 
For patent policy to be effective and efficient it must as nearly as possible provide patents for inventions 
which would not otherwise occur, but not provide windfall benefits for inventions which would occur 
anyway. As noted above a close practical approximation to this policy goal is to focus patents in areas 
with large lumpy development costs where exclusive time in the market would prevent these costs being 
recouped. To a large extent a technology base aligns with this goal.  
Only technological inventions are patentable.  
Things that are not markedly different from things found in nature are discoveries and are 
not patentable.  
Inventions based on mathematical algorithms, including all software, should be excluded 
from patentability as they do not meet the technology requirement. 
Methods of medical treatment should be specifically excluded within a broad exclusion 
where inventions are required to protect life, health and the environment.  
It was the pharmaceutical industry which drove the TRIPS requirement of technological neutrality. In a 
great act of inconsistency this industry successfully lobbied for an extension in the term of all patents to 
20 years in TRIPS, then argued for further extensions to offset "regulatory delays". The pharmaceutical 
industry has thus succeeded in an overall extension in patent term for all technologies, on the basis of 
argument about their own industry,18 and then in many nations, including Australia has gained another 5 
years, giving a possible 25 years of patent protection.  
Patent term extensions should be resisted. Where they are allowed a condition should be 
presentation of financial data to government showing that a risk-adjusted return on the 
R&D investment has not yet been achieved.  
5. Requiring genuine inventiveness 
If a technological limitation were combined with other features designed to identify innovations which 
would not take place absent patents, the benefit-cost outcome of patent systems could be considerably 
improved. Ideally one would require evidence of large lumpy R&D outlays and of high-speed imitation. 
These yardsticks come far closer to evidence on the underlying market failure that the current thresholds 
for grant of a patent (novelty, inventiveness and industrial application). Unfortunately these traditional 
features of anglo patent law are written into TRIPS (Article 27(1)).  
TRIPS allows countries the flexibility to define their own standards of novelty, inventiveness and 
industrial application. Patents are nowadays being granted – in very large volumes – for all kinds of 
"inventions" that seem quite obvious in the ordinary meaning of that word. The issue of very low patent 
quality – a mere scintilla of inventiveness – has been well documented (see, for example, Pilch 2003; 
Lunney 2004; Blonder 2005; Quillen Jr. 2006; Lawson 2008; Lunney and Johnson 2012; Moir 2013b). So 
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 Pilch provides this translation from the Court's 1976 Disposition Program decision (Pilch 2003: 293).  
18
 Argument, not evidence. The pharmaceutical industry has never tabled data showing they are unable to achieve 
a risk-adjusted return on their R&D investments without these term extensions.  
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too has the lack of precision in patent claims, creating substantial uncertainty over what is in the public 
realm and what is private property (Bessen and Meurer 2008).  
There are no empirical data on the distribution of inventions by degree of inventiveness – indeed one of 
the difficulties with inventiveness as a threshold criterion for the grant of a patent is its subjectiveness. 
However, it seems reasonable to suppose that truly radical inventions are far rarer than those exhibiting 
only a small degree of inventiveness. Dahlin and Behrens (2005) develop a measure for identifying truly 
radical patented inventions. In applying their approach to 581 tennis racquet patents they discard 
measures identifying first 118 patents then 25 patents before settling on a measure which identifies just 
six patents – around 1 per cent of the total. They find this aligns well with independent evidence.  
Similarly there is little information about the distribution of inventions by the quantum of new 
knowledge they embody. This is despite economists' focus on spillovers from new knowledge as the 
critical factor justifying intervention in the market for inventions and innovations. Again, however, it 
seems likely that many inventions would embody a small quantum of new knowledge while only a small 
number would contain a very large quantum of new knowledge.  
For any given set of inventions, those which are radically inventive are not necessarily those which 
contribute most new knowledge and vice versa. Nonetheless there may be some degree of alignment 
and certainly it seems likely that the distribution of inventions along either dimension would be skewed 
towards those that are less inventive and/or contain less new knowledge. A possible distribution is 
shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Distribution of inventions  
 
 
If the goal of patent policy is to grant patents only for those inventions which contain a benefit to the 
nation which exceeds the cost of the monopoly provided, then the "inventiveness" standard needs to be 
set towards the right-hand side of the distribution. The Australian parliament was recently advised that 
patents were granted only for things that are "a significant advance over what is known or used".19 Such 
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 Explanatory Memorandum to the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill 2011, p. 42. 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/s837_ems_561ef790-9811-43d0-b14f-
04c924723c94/upload_pdf/356916em.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf. Explanatory memoranda play a critical role 
in interpreting statute law and are an essential component of any new legislation presented to the Australian 
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a standard is shown in Figure 2, broken line AA. Only inventions to the right of this line would be granted 
patents. This standard might also perhaps be close to Dahlin and Behrins' first-cut measure identifying 20 
per cent of granted patents as relatively inventive. 
But what happens in patent law and administration is quite different. While the process of construing 
applications involves identifying what is different from existing knowledge (prior art), subsequent steps 
do not involve either the question "is it inventive?" or "what new knowledge has been contributed?" 
Indeed patent statutes have imported a different question from case law. The Australian statute20 and 
the European Patent Convention (EPC)21 state that a patent application is taken to be inventive unless it 
is shown to be obvious. The onus of proof therefore lies with the patent office to show that an 
application does not meet patentability standards, rather than with the applicant to show that a patent 
is merited. This presumption of inventiveness sets up the wrong question, shown in Figure 2 as broken 
line BB. Those applications which are found to be obvious – to the left of line BB – are refused patents.22 
This leaves a large set of inventions – those between lines AA and BB – which are granted patents but 
which do not contribute enough to the community to offset the monopoly costs.  
Figure 2: Distribution of inventions by current and proposed tests 
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Granting patents to the set of "inventions" which fall between BB and AA means that the spillover 
benefits will be few (if any) while there will be (possibly substantial) costs in reduced competition, higher 
prices, and the diversion of resources to finding out "how to do in a somewhat different way what we 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
parliament. Available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/s837_ems_561ef790-9811-
43d0-b14f-04c924723c94/upload_pdf/356916em.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf  
20
 The Patents Act 1990 states "For the purposes of this Act, an invention [application] is to be taken to involve an 
inventive step when compared with the prior art base unless the invention would have been obvious to a person 
skilled in the relevant art in the light of …" Section 7(2), emphasis added.  
21
 "An invention [application] shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the 
art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art" (EPC, Article 56, emphasis added).  
22
 Interestingly very few patent offices refuse applications. Where examiners raise substantial problems, there will 
usually be a series of correspondence. In the end either the applicant gives up (actively, by withdrawing the 
application or, more often, passively by ceasing to pay renewal fees) or the patent office gives in.  
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have already learned to do in a satisfactory way" – a policy-induced shift that "would hardly be given 
highest priority in a rational allocation of resources" (Machlup 1958: 51).  
No amount of refinement to the question "is it obvious" will overcome the fact that this is the wrong 
question and does not work to limit patents to genuinely inventive applications. An example can assist in 
clarifying. Another subjective dimension is that which runs from ugly to beautiful. Determining a short-
list of who is beautiful cannot be done by removing from the set only those deemed ugly.  
If the wrong question is currently being asked, there is no point tinkering with its myriad details, from 
the requirement that the inventiveness judge have no imagination,23 to the rules determining just what 
sub-set of existing knowledge is allowable as "prior art". These rules – established by courts rather than 
through careful policy design – have resulted in systems biased to the grant of uninventive patents, 
radically affecting the economic impact of the patent system (FTC 2003). 
The quantum of inventiveness is essentially a subjective measure, though it can be constrained to a 
greater degree of objectivity by asking what is the new knowledge contributed. Importantly, 
inventiveness as a criterion for patentability is based on the distance between the knowledge 
contributed and the previous existing knowledge. The greater the distance, the more radical the 
invention.24 As a consequence there are few useable empirical studies of the quantum of inventiveness. 
Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez (2005) assess the inventiveness of 50 of the best US software patents 
against the low standards of the USPTO. While finding only two of these potentially invalid, they 
comment that they are all only incremental inventions – i.e. that they embody only a low degree of 
inventiveness.  
My research on a small universe of granted patents, identifying the essence of the invention and 
comparing this to existing knowledge to identify what new knowledge was contributed, found no new 
knowledge in any of the patented "inventions" (Moir 2013b). My study confirmed that the anecdotes 
cited by others as evidence of low inventiveness standards are not just anecdotes but are the norm. My 
work also identifies a range of legal doctrines (policy rules) which drive the standard to low levels. 
Particularly important are rules about assessing inventions which combine already known elements; 
applying known processes in (often marginally) different fields; and allowing semantics to trump 
technology in defining inventiveness. The patent world also includes that surprising feature that 
something which is not inventive acquires inventiveness if it becomes less (its scope narrows).  
An important policy rule that used to prevail in Europe, the USA and Australia was the synergy test. This 
was that a new combination of known elements had to contain a surprising and unexpected result or 
give rise to a result that is greater than the sum of the elements to be patentable. This rule still prevails 
in Europe. But in Australia and the USA it was abandoned in the early 1980s and replaced with a rule 
requiring documentation that the specific combination was obvious.25 Without such documentation 
examiners are not allowed to reject a new combination of known parts as being obvious. In 2007 the 
Supreme Court partially addressed this new doctrine, advising the CAFC of "the need for caution in 
granting a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior art" going on to note that a 
simple combination of known elements that has predictable results is obvious (i.e. unpatentable).26 
                                                          
23
 A rule clearly overturned by the US Supreme Court in 2007 (KSR v. Teleflex 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007)) but still 
operating elsewhere, for example in Australia.  
24
 There is a mixed literature on the value of citations, particularly forward citations (citations of the patent of 
interest in subsequent patent applications). This is well summarized by Moser and colleagues (2013) who present 
empirical data showing that forward citations are positively correlated with test data on comparative yields for new 
corn hybrids. Interestingly, their set of granted patents shows (in Figure 1) a distribution of relative yields centred 
on zero improvement, with a long negative tail. Thus while the forward citations are positively related to relative 
yields, the patents are often of less productive rather than more productive hybrids. 
25
 The shift from the synergy to the suggestion test occurred in Australia in 1980 (Minnesota Mining and 
Manufacturing v Beiersdorf (Australia) (1980) 144 CLR 253). In the USA Lunney and Johnson (2012) trace it to the 
1984 ACS Hospital Systems, Inc. v. Montefiore Hospital, 732 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  
26
 KSR v. Teleflex 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007) at 549-550.  
11 
The analogous use doctrine dates from the nineteenth century and was designed to exclude from 
patentability the simple use of a known thing for a different use for which it is entirely suitable. This 
doctrine is either defunct or is not being used in Australia and the USA for process applications. There are 
many famous examples of business method patents which are simply the analogous use of known 
processes particularly on the internet. For example Amazon's one-click patent simply uses centuries old 
processes of a customer adding items to an account.  
Simple differences in non-technical elements also seem to confer patentable inventiveness. In some 
cases these are just differences in wording. In the case of one Australian banking patent an invention 
that was virtually identical to an existing product was patented because it offered benefits not rewards, 
and because account linking was compulsory not optional.27 In some cases patents are granted because a 
human actor is different. A centuries old process for holding goods while checking credit was allowed in 
the USA because the party undertaking the credit checking was a freight forwarder (shipper).28 In a 
patent for sending email alerts for anomalous financial events, the addition of user definition to the 
anomalous events lifted the invention over the inventiveness threshold.29 
Another trick in acquiring patents with the low current inventiveness standard is to narrow the scope of 
the claimed monopoly. Only in the patent world is this surreal outcome possible – that making an 
"invention" smaller can give it inventiveness that it did not previously have. Examples from my dataset 
include an expert medical system with the added feature of the server going to stand-by mode once the 
message has been sent,30 a system for authenticating access to financial systems where the argument 
with the examiner was over the location of the encrypted fingerprints,31 the addition of an interface to a 
business data mapping invention;32 and converting dates to binary code for a diary management 
process.33  
These examples clearly demonstrate the dysfunctional rules currently used to determine grant of a 
patent. With such rules it is not surprising that the grant of obvious patents is the norm. Such obvious 
patents contain no new knowledge. If they dominate the patent system – as seems likely given the rules 
– they can more than offset any positive benefits from genuinely inventive inventions. They show how 
the practical application of the scintilla standard allows almost any trivial invention to be patented.  
Another shock to the economist when investigating how the patent system works in practice is that the 
patentability tests of novelty and inventiveness are applied after certain categories of knowledge have 
been ruled out. Novelty, for example, is tested against only one written document at a time, and a 
footnote in that document to another document is not sufficient evidence to allow both documents to 
be used. In the USA and Australia the practice has grown up of defining the relevant technological field 
narrowly, thus excluding some existing knowledge from the base against which inventiveness is tested.34  
In the USA examiners must state why a patent should be granted in the Notice of Allowance. Sometimes 
such statements are uninformative, simply regurgitating large extracts of legalistic claims language. More 
often they provide an insight into just what element of a clearly uninventive process has allowed the 
application to pass the inventiveness test. This approach contrasts with that at the EPO where no such 
statement is required. It is not therefore possible to understand, for example, just what element in 
shifting words from a dependent to an independent claim suddenly gives an application both technicality 
                                                          
27
 Westpac's Integrated financial service product (AU2005204292, priority August 2005). 
28
 US 09/610772, Notice of Allowance 23 March 2005, and 11/097491, Notice of Allowance 2 May 2007 (On-line 
Interactive System and Method for Transacting Business).  
29
 A Security System, AU2003262344, priority September 2003. 
30
 Medical data warning notifying system and method, AU2003281184, priority July 2002. 
31
 Method of conducting transactions over a network, AU2004203415, priority February 2000. 
32
 A system and method for representation of business information, AU2004201587, priority April 2004. 
33
 A method of determining a target event of a reoccurring event, AU2006200104, priority May 2005. All 
computerised diaries have to convert dates (and all other inputs) to binary code. 
34
 See Bagley (2001) for evidence in regard to the USA and Welcome Real-Time SA v. Catuity Inc, [2001] FCA 445 (17 
May 2001) at 140 for evidence that a well-known IT technique is inventive to persons in the consumer loyalty field.  
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and inventiveness (see section 7C). Requiring examiners to make a clear statement as to why a patent 
grant is merited focuses attention on the duty to the public not to grant patents for trivial inventions.  
The test for inventiveness needs to be recast into a positive form. The examination process – and any 
legal wrangles about validity – must centre on identifying the benefit arising from the invention, either in 
terms of new knowledge contributed or a contribution to net consumer surplus, such as a significant 
increase in health outcomes. The onus of proof must shift to the applicant to demonstrate that the 
privilege of preventing competition is merited. Doctrines which excise sets of existing knowledge before 
applying tests for patentability must be removed. Patent systems can be re-designed to use an 
inventiveness test set to ensure each granted application would deliver a net benefit to the nation. Such 
an approach contrasts sharply with the leaked text of the TPPA IP chapter which would provide patents 
to "any new forms, uses, or methods of using a known product … even if such invention does not result 
in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that product."
35
 This very low standard would encourage 
rent-seeking and a shift of resources into the process of patenting rather than into genuine innovation.  
 
Proposals to ensure a strong inventive step requirement 
Countries must be free to set the inventive step at a high level. They must have the right to 
reform the dysfunctionally low "is it obvious" approach replacing this with a positive 
approach designed to ensure sufficient inventiveness to produce a net benefit from each 
granted patent. The appropriate threshold questions for patent grant are:  
• "what new knowledge or social benefit is contributed?" and  
• "is this sufficient to provide total benefits which outweigh the costs of reduced 
competition?" 
The onus must rest with applicants to demonstrate that they meet patentability standards. 
Applications should not be presumed either novel or inventive.  
All exclusions from existing knowledge for the novelty and inventiveness tests must be 
removed: i.e. the whole concept of prior art needs to be abandoned. It is entirely 
inappropriate to tilt the playing field against the public interest before applying tests for 
patentability.  
The following types of "inventiveness" must be specified as below the threshold for patent 
grant: 
• new uses of known things or processes (including use in new environments); 
→ specifically excluding new therapeutic treatments using known compounds 
• combinations of known elements or processes  
→ unless an unexpected outcome delivers sufficient spillover benefits to outweigh 
the costs of reduced competition 
The higher standard would be reinforced if examiners were required, in authorising the 
patent grant, to clearly specify the benefit which will pass to the public. This should include 
a clear description of the new knowledge contributed and how this will create a spillover 
benefit or a substantial improvement in health outcomes. Such documents should be part of 
the public record.  
 
These principles do not have nice sharp unarguable boundaries. But nor does the current "not obvious" 
system. Further the current system has developed built-in complexity, increasing costs for business and 
the community alike. Over the centuries since ordinary courts have adjudicated on these matters they 
have systematically avoided making precise definitions of what is patentable. They have developed a 
number of specific tests, many of which have later been replaced as insufficiently useful. The key issue is 
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 Article 8 (http://keepthewebopen.com/assets/pdfs/TPP%20IP%20Chapter%20Proposal.pdf) 
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that at the end of the day patents should be granted only when it is clear they have at least some 
chance of producing external benefits to offset the costs they impose on other firms and on 
consumers.  
The proposed approach would make it harder for applicants to demonstrate the merit of their 
inventions. But for genuinely inventive inventions – for example for pharmaceuticals which produce a 
genuine improvement in efficacy – there should be no difficulty. The intent of these reforms is to 
eliminate trivial workshop modifications and improvements not to stop the grant of patents for genuine 
inventions. This approach will clean much of the rubbish out of the system, making life simpler and 
easier for innovating firms. No longer will firms have to spend large amounts on gaining patents to swap 
with their competitors so they can all proceed as though the patent system does not exist. These 
activities simply divert resources away from productive R&D and into non-productive regulatory activity. 
Where a firm (or individual) has made a genuine advance in technology there should be no difficulty in 
demonstrating the benefit and gaining the patent privilege. 
What would be ideal would be to experiment with approaches along these lines. At present 
experimentation to ensure that the inventive step balances costs and benefits is actively discouraged, 
particularly by "Big Pharma" backed up by the USTR.36 Such experimentation would be useful in 
developing workable practices to implement the positive "is it inventive enough?" test. It would be ideal 
if at least a sub-set of countries could be allowed to experiment without incurring trade sanctions. Ideally 
these would be either countries which have relatively small markets (for example Australia which is two 
per cent of the OECD market and just one per cent of the global pharmaceutical market), which do not 
have an embedded tradition of granting patents for every trivial variation (for example India) or 
countries which can start with a clean slate (new WTO members with no history of patent privileges such 
as Cambodia and Laos).  
6. Privileges 
The patent system is a very blunt instrument – providing an incentive for one party's invention by 
allowing the prevention of invention by other parties. Patent policy therefore needs to be carefully 
crafted to ensure that the privileges granted are well targeted and parsimonious. Privileges that are not 
needed to create the R&D incentive must be avoided because of the high risk that they will impede 
invention by other firms and individuals.  
TRIPS spells out the privileges which must be embodied in the patent grant. The patent owner must be 
allowed to prevent third parties from "making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing" the 
patented invention unless permission has been granted (Article 28).37 These are the privileges which 
were conferred in the late 1800s when a condition of "local working" was the norm in patent systems. 
Local working required that a patented invention be actually produced in the country. This requirement 
had the effect of creating pathways along which knowledge benefits could spill over to other firms and 
craftspeople. Generally if a patent was not worked within a period of (usually) three years, any other 
party could seek to use the patented invention. Over recent decades local working has come into 
disfavour as being an implicit form of non-tariff barrier. While there is a certain element of truth in this 
perspective, this would be more persuasive if the privileges granted had been re-assessed when the local 
working requirement was removed. With no local working requirement, there will frequently be no 
benefit to the patent-granting nation. The patent thus becomes a simple rent-extraction device 
                                                          
36
 The US Trade Representative regularly reports on countries which do not meet US requirements on patenting, 
threatening these with trade sanctions. In the recent legal dispute between Novartis and the Indian Patent Office 
over the refusal of a patent which did not provide demonstrated improved efficacy, the USTR has made its 
displeasure clear and both the EU and the USA have exerted pressure on India to reduce its inventiveness standard 
to the current low levels applying in the USA and in Europe (R Ramachandran, "Western warnings", Frontline, 29:8 
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2908/stories/20120504290801800.htm ).  
37
 Only the right to prevent import is qualified – Article 6 states that, in the context of dispute settlement, nothing 
in TRIPS shall be taken to address the issue of exhaustion of privileges (parallel importing). 
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regardless of the returns already made on the R&D investment. It simply leads to income flows from 
technology-importing nations.38 In such situations it is questionable whether a patent system achieves its 
goal of increased R&D investment. If this effect is sufficiently large – for example in economies where 
most patented inventions are imported – it can make a nation much worse off. The technology-exporting 
nation thus benefits from spillovers at home and rent-extraction from overseas – a kind of double-
dipping.  
An example illustrates. In Australia, where term extensions are regularly granted for pharmaceutical 
compounds, the situation can frequently arise where a compound is out of patent in an overseas 
economy but still in patent in Australia.39 Generic companies are prevented from making the product for 
export to the overseas market until the patent ceases in Australia. This situation makes generic 
companies operating from Australia less globally competitive than those in overseas countries where the 
patent has already expired. The benefit to the patent owner is small; it ensures that Australian generic 
companies will be delayed in their local market entry after the patent has expired. This delay – which 
occurs for a range of practical reasons – is effectively an unapproved extension in the already lengthy 
patent term.  
The core of the privilege conferred on the patent owner is the privilege to prevent others from 
undermining the higher price that can be charged when competition is restrained. This is the action of 
selling in the jurisdiction where the patent has been granted. In a world without any local working 
requirement the only privilege that should be granted by the patent should be the privilege of preventing 
others from selling into the protected market. 
This privilege however raises issues about parallel importing and whether it is appropriate for 
governments to support specific business models which simply increase prices for their consumers. 
Where a global company owns patents in a number of countries it is likely to set prices differentially for 
many of these countries. Such "what the market will bear" pricing models are a long way from the 
economists' welfare-maximising world of marginal-cost pricing. One consequence is parallel importing – 
where retailers act on opportunities to import officially produced goods (ie goods produced with the 
authority of the patent holder) if they can source these more cheaply. Naturally this undercuts demand 
for the higher-priced goods sold directly by the patent holder.  
Clearly this undermines the profit that can be obtained for the patented product. If the market where 
this happens is a major market for the patent holder this might reduce profits below those required to 
obtain a reasonable return on the R&D. This would destroy the patent incentive. But if the market is a 
small part of global markets, and/or a good return has already been achieved, parallel importing acts to 
ameliorate the negative impact of patent systems on consumers, re-introducing an element of 
competition. A solution would be to grant a right to prevent import if (and only if) the product being sold 
was produced domestically and the company could demonstrate that a risk-adjusted return on their R&D 
investment had not yet been achieved. This approach would be consistent with the "national treatment" 
requirements of TRIPS. 
The net cost of patent systems was considerably increased by removing local working requirements 
without also streamlining privileges. The preferred approach of limiting the patent privilege to sale 
would require an amendment to TRIPS. Developing economies – and economies with strongly negative 
balances on intangibles trade – would do well to flag the desire to amend Article 28 of TRIPS (perhaps 
under the auspices of WIPO's Committee on Development and Intellectual Property). The goal would be 
a system where: 
                                                          
38 Australia, for example runs a negative balance on its trade in "intellectual property". IP receipts over the past 
decade have been of the order of 0.25% to 0.5% of the current account and payments have been two to eight times 
larger at 1.0% to 1.5% (IP Australia 2013: 22 sourcing data to Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012) Account 5302.0 
balance of payments and international investment position). 
39
 This issue was considered in depth by the 2012-13 Australian Pharmaceutical Patents Review (the website for this 
review was taken down during the 2013 caretaker government period and has not yet been replaced. Please email 
hazel.moir@anu.edu.au for copies of the issues paper, the draft report and all submissions.  
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The sole privilege granted by a patent is the right to prevent sale into the market.  
There is no right to prevent the import and sale of goods produced legitimately elsewhere, 
unless the product is locally produced and the patentee can demonstrate that  
a risk-adjusted return to the R&D investment has not yet been achieved.  
7. Incentives, penalties and strategic gaming 
A range of incentives and disincentives are embedded in the patent system. These are rarely discussed. 
For example, it is widely known that the incentive to challenge an invalidly granted patent is far lower 
than the incentive to sue for infringement. This is due to the fact that if a patent-holder sues for 
infringement and wins s/he gains all the consequent benefits (damages, costs, payment of license fees 
and a greater ease in obtaining license fees from other parties). But where an innovating firm finds their 
business path blocked by a seemingly invalid patent, s/he would bear all the costs and risks of the legal 
action yet instantly share all the benefits of clearer market access with all other companies competing in 
that field. There is one exception. The US Hatch-Waxman Act provides an incentive to companies which 
successfully challenge an invalid pharmaceutical patent – they gain a period of 180 days of market 
exclusivity for their generic version.40  
Another perverse incentive is that while a firm with an invalid patent will be forced to pay legal costs and 
damages, there is no requirement for firms with invalid patents to repay the profits they have made 
from these patents unless each party sues individually. This is both inefficient and unfair. As the recent 
example of the patents over BRACA1 and BRACA2 genes shows, patents can be used for most of their 
market life before they are found fully or partially invalid. In contrast, where a firm is found to infringe a 
valid patent, one form of compensation is the payment of all profits derived from this infringement. 
These clearly asymmetrical penalty structures lead to a situation where there is no disincentive to 
seeking patents for trivial inventions. 
A. Penalties for infringement 
Penalties for infringement are well developed in patent systems. Over recent decades there have been 
changes in the basis on which patent-holders are compensated for infringement, principally in the USA. A 
major change was access to injunctions shutting down infringing operations rather than requiring 
payment of an appropriate royalty (Jaffe and Lerner 2004: 111-115). Another is much increased damages 
payments. Hall and Ziedonis, in interviewing firms in the US semi-conductor industry, found that the 
demonstration effect of the Kodak-Polaroid case in 1986 and the Texas Instruments case in 1985-86 had 
made firms very much more aware of patents and their economic impacts (Hall and Ziedonis 2001: 109).  
Several decades after it became common in the USA there has been a shift towards prohibiting infringing 
action as a penalty for patent infringement. Patent policy involves a tension between the economic goal 
of disseminating new knowledge and technology and the supposed need of a competitive restraint to 
provide an incentive for its creation. Because of this tension the general approach had been to provide 
for royalty payments where there was infringing use of a patented technology. This simultaneously 
ensured a proper incentive for the inventor and the more widespread use of the technology. The 
precedent-setting penalties in the Kodak-Polaroid case involved an extremely high cost to many innocent 
parties, particularly those who lost their jobs.  
Patent policy is economic policy, designed to encourage investment in R&D that would not otherwise 
occur. It operates by granting the patentee the right to prevent others from operating in the claimed 
technological space. Patent policy – like copyright policy – is specified in legislation which gives the 
authority for parties whose privileges have been breached to take legal action to enforce their rights. It is 
clear that these laws are civil laws. Any action which undermines the granted rights can cause an 
economic loss to the privilege-holder – but this is not a criminal matter, it is a matter that should be 
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 This privilege is limited to the first generic entrant (see Holovac 2004).  
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pursued through civil courts. The introduction of criminal penalties into copyright law was an accident of 
history.41 Unfortunately it has spread globally and patent privilege-holders are now seeking its extension 
to patent policy. There is no sound reason for this. Because of the damage patents can cause to other 
innovating firms, it is important that infringement penalties be as parsimonious as the privileges granted. 
They need to be focused on compensation for lost earnings and must avoid damage to innocent third 
parties (such as employees).  
Patent law is civil law and all penalties should be civil.  
As the damage done by infringement is hurt of profits, penalties should focus on 
ameliorating this hurt. Patent infringement penalties should, to the maximum extent 
possible, avoid doing harm to innocent parties. 
Normal rules should apply, with alleged infringers being assumed innocent until proven 
guilty.42 
B Incentives to maintain patent standards 
In contrast to penalties for infringement, little consideration has been given to penalties for attempting 
to undermine the patent system. In the USA there are penalties for deliberately misleading the Patent 
Office. More generally "fair basis" rules attempt to limit unfair use of divisionals and amendments. But 
there are limited penalties for reaping profits from an invalidly granted patent, although this can 
substantially harm many consumers as well as other innovative firms. Nor are there penalties for 
undermining the system itself and substituting semantics for technology, pretending software is not 
software, or pretending that discoveries can be classed as inventions (e.g. DNA).  
The lack of penalties for exploiting an invalid patent encourages a form of moral hazard – it creates 
strong incentives for firms to try to gain patents for "inventions" that fall far short of delivering any 
benefit. While a firm successfully challenging a patent will be awarded damages, other parties have no 
cheap or simple avenue to seek compensation. In Australia, for example, a secondary pharmaceutical 
patent over clopidogrel delayed generic entry by 3 years. A 5-year term extension on the patent was 
simultaneously invalidated. It has been estimated that the total cost to the Australian taxpayer of use of 
this invalid patent was some $A540 to 660 million.43 There are no mechanisms for the government to 
seek repayment of this unjustified subsidy beyond the $A60 million accruing during the injunction period 
(Moir and Palombi 2013: 25).  
There is considerable "doctrinal incoherence" (silly outcomes) in the patent system. Thambisetty points 
to a UK case where the failed challenger of a patent's validity had to pay damages for infringement even 
after the patent had been revoked after a successful subsequent challenge.44 This is economic policy 
gone mad.  
When tax is erroneously under-estimated there are well-established mechanisms for this to be repaid 
(including with penalties depending on the circumstances). When social security payments are made in 
error, these are recouped from the recipient. Providing a parallel mechanism for ensuring that patent-
holders do not benefit from unjustified monopolies would substantially change the incentive for firms to 
seek more and more patents for trivial "inventions". It would also ensure any unjustified profits would be 
repaid. 
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 See Boldrin and Levine (2008, chapter 2, pp32-33) for an account of the disruptions caused by private actions to 
enforce new copyright privileges in respect of sheet music. This led to a new copyright law in 1902 which for the 
first time made copyright violation a criminal offence.  
42
 Unfortunately the TRIPS Agreement includes a reverse onus of proof in respect of pharmaceutical process 
patents (Article 34).  
43
 Alphapharm submission to the Australian Government's Pharmaceutical Patents Review 
(http://pharmapatentsreview.govspace.gov.au/files/2013/02/2013-02-12-Alphapharm-Submission-PUBLIC.pdf), p.6. For a 
copy see footnote 39.  
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 Coflexip v Stolt Comex [2004] FSR 7 (Ch (Pat Ct)) and [2004] FSR 34 (CA) see Thambisetty 2009: 23. 
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Patent statutes should specify clear mechanisms to fully recover profits earned from 
products based on invalidated patents. 
Jensen and Webster (2004) analyse the systems-wide effects of how administrative errors can impact on 
patent systems. They identify as Type I errors those cases where a "desirable" application is rejected and 
as Type II errors those cases where a "bad" application is accepted. A "bad" patent is one which would 
happen anyway or where there are insufficient spillover benefits to offset costs. A "good" patent is one 
contributing new knowledge from which other firms and inventors can benefit. Type II errors are far 
more likely when the inventive step is low. An important related issue is who bears the cost of correcting 
administrative errors?  
With Type I errors – most likely when the inventive step is high – a "good" patent is rejected. In this 
circumstance it is the applicant who bears the cost of seeking a review. All jurisdictions provide 
substantial opportunities for rejected patent applicants to challenge an unfavourable decision. With Type 
I errors it is the party seeking the monopoly privilege who bears all costs and risks of seeking a second 
opinion and who will gain the full return if successful.  
In contrast, where the inventive step is low and Type II errors are more likely, it is innocent third parties 
who bear the costs of dealing with incorrect decisions. As noted above a firm affected by a dubious 
patent faces a poor risk-return trade-off for the option of challenging patent validity. It makes sense for 
such a firm to "fly under the radar" with respect to dubious patents, arguing these out-of-court, or 
counter-suing for invalidity if formal infringement proceedings are brought. With current incentive 
structures public policy cannot rely on affected third parties challenging invalid patents and so 
maintaining high standards in the patent system. There is nothing in the system to prevent the standard 
from falling and falling.  
This situation could be radically changed if patent holders were required to repay all profits ever earned 
from any patent declared invalid. After reimbursing the challenging firm for legal and other costs in 
mounting the challenge, the balance could be shared between the challenging firm and agencies 
representing competition and consumer interests. It is, after all, consumers and competitors who bear 
the costs of the patent system.  
Introduce clear mechanisms for patent holders to repay all profits made from products 
underpinned by patents which are subsequently found invalid: 
Share these repaid profits between the successful challenger and consumer and 
competition advocacy bodies.  
Outside of pharmaceutical patents, the incentive to challenge bad patents has been particularly low in 
the USA where granted patents have a presumption of validity. This adds substantially to the costs and 
risks of a third party challenger. The Australian patent statute expressly states that there is no 
presumption of validity in the fact that a patent has been granted.45 Despite this a Federal Court judge 
has recently qualified this express disclaimer stating that “[r]egistration of the patent is, of itself, prima 
facie evidence of validity.”46 Again this indicates that (some) judges have little hesitation in changing the 
law, regardless of the express wording of the statute. As Quillen noted in relation to judicially 
determined extensions to patentable subject matter in the USA such judicial policy-making occurs 
"without any inquiry into the facts" or the public policy implications (Quillen Jr. 2008: 71). When policy is 
made in this manner it is no wonder it creates unbalanced sub-optimal outcomes. A reminder from the 
responsible Minister that this misreads parliamentary intent would be appropriate.  
In the USA a granted patent is presumed valid, while there is no such presumption about a claim to 
infringement. This means that the standard of proof required for the alleged infringing party is higher 
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("clear and convincing evidence") than it is for the patent-holder ("preponderance of the evidence").47 
History shows that patent offices tend to grant many patents which courts subsequently find invalid. 
Quillen (2006) reports on a 1980 study – prior to the shift to presumed validity – by Koenig (1980) which 
calculated that US appeal courts found nearly two-thirds of patents challenged for validity were in fact 
invalid. This is an extremely high error rate. Patent offices work closely with those who seek patents and 
those who assist would-be patent-holders. But they have little contact with innovating firms which are 
harmed by the grant of invalid patents. These factors probably underlie problematic outcomes such as 
"Swiss medical claims" where the Swiss Patent Office designed a set of words which could be used to 
undermine the clear intent of the EPC (see next section). As noted above the system is biased against the 
challenge of trivial patents. Given these factors, it is not surprising that patent offices tend to err towards 
the grant of invalid patents rather than the protection of the public from trivial patents. Given the high 
likelihood that patent offices will inappropriately grant patents for trivial inventions, it is important that 
the standard of proof required to demonstrate that an "invention" is neither novel nor inventive be set a 
sensible level.  
No granted patent can be presumed valid. 
C Strategic games playing: semantics 
The lack of clearly thought through incentives and disincentives in the patent system combines with the 
(possibly deliberate) lack of policy-oriented data to ensure substantial strategic games playing. Such 
games range through the deliberate flouting of authorising legislation (for example "Swiss medical 
claims") through evergreening to frequent but low-level games where semantic inventiveness replaces 
technological inventiveness.  
When one starts studying the patent system one of the first striking aspects is its peculiarly archaic 
language. "Art" is used to mean technology, though "prior art" means allowable existing knowledge. If 
judges used modern language – such as technology for technology – might they have been more 
circumspect in extending patent privileges to fields such as business methods? Certainly business is an 
art, but it is not a technology in any normal sense of the word. Members of the patent community 
strongly resist attempts to modernise the language. It appears that continued use of archaic language is 
integral to the complexity which puts outsiders off enquiring too closely into the costs and benefits of 
the patent system. For example using the phrase "prior art" for "allowable existing knowledge" hides the 
limits placed on existing knowledge before the novelty and inventiveness tests are applied. Indeed in a 
recent Australian case the judge discounted evidence by experts for the infringing party on the basis that 
they did not understand the meaning of the word obvious as it is used in patent law.48 
All patent terminology should be current commonly used language and all words should 
take their ordinary meanings. 
While semantic problems bedevil rules and procedures, arguments about shades of meaning in words 
are also frequently found during the examination process. Such complaints are not new, but remain 
unaddressed. Edwards, for example, comments that: "[a]s it reaches the patent office the application 
combines technological and legal invention, and the latter, if of superior quality, may do much to offset 
deficiencies in the former" (Edwards 1949: 218). My own empirical work has focused on business 
method patents, which not being a technology might be more subject to such linguistic arguments. 
Nonetheless the examples found there are startling. In three out of four cases where the European 
Patent Office (EPO) granted a patent for the proposed business "invention" the application was initially 
rejected as not technically inventive. But when specific words were moved from dependent to 
independent claims suddenly a patent was granted (Moir 2013a). Unfortunately EPO examiners do not 
have to give any reason for grant of a patent, so one cannot interrogate the underlying thinking. 
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Certainly from a policy viewpoint there can be no benefit to the public in the grant of a patent where 
"inventiveness" is based on narrow shades of linguistic meaning, or which claim they are in, rather than 
genuine technological invention. Recommendations have been made above (Section 5) to prevent 
semantics replacing technology and knowledge as a basis for patentability.  
Some types of semantic inventiveness are used at a strategic level and have system-wide impacts. For 
example the EPC limits the patentability of methods of medical treatment. But the EPO grant patents for 
the first medical use of a known substance. This seems at odds with the wording of Article 53: 
"European  patents shall not be granted in respect of: … 
(c)  methods for treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic 
methods practised on the human or animal body; this provision shall not apply to products, in 
particular substances or compositions, for use in any of these methods." 
Clearly Article 53 allows pharmaceutical products to be patented, but equally clearly, at least to the non-
lawyer, it excludes patents for specific medical uses of pharmaceutical products, as these are prescribed 
for therapeutic treatment. Setting aside this conundrum on patenting first medical uses, Thambisetty 
indicates that "as a response to pressure from the pharmaceutical industry the EPO was interested in 
extending patent product protection to second medical use of known products" (Thambisetty 2009: 17). 
She provides an example of the minor variation in wording designed by the Swiss Patent Office to 
overcome this exclusion (a technique known as "Swiss medical claims"). This comes very close to those 
who are supposed to uphold the law taking action to undermine it. It is possible in large part because the 
patent system's deliberate complexity hides it from proper accountability and evaluation mechanisms 
(see next section). 
Some of the decisions of the quasi courts of the EPO (the Technical Boards of Appeal) involve at least 
substantial mental gymnastics – though some consider the EPO "outright violates the European Patent 
Convention" (Bakels 2012: 2). Such semantic games have been roundly criticised by UK courts. In the 
most strongly worded of these admonitions, Prescott J stated that "[y]ou are not allowed to get round 
the objection – that you are attempting to patent a computer program – by claiming it as a physical 
artefact, a mere change of form."49 
Stepping back from the patent system one is reminded of the "creative accounting" of the late 1970s and 
early 1980s that allowed payment of tax liabilities to be discretionary for many of those with highly 
trained tax lawyers. The public revulsion over the existence of choice in the payment of tax led to a 
substantial degree of reform with overarching principles trumping specific rules. Thus "anti-avoidance" 
principles deem specific financial arrangements void for tax purposes if their principle purpose is to avoid 
payment of tax. The semantic games in the patenting industry seem designed to obtain patent 
monopolies for trivial "inventions". They could be addressed with similar approaches.50 
Anti-avoidance principles developed to reduce taxation liabilities should be investigated and 
adapted for use in patent systems. In particular the technique where over-arching principles 
trump specific rules could usefully be investigated. 
8. Transparency, evaluation and audit 
One reason economists are so reluctant to endorse regulatory interventions in markets is that such 
interventions create the opportunity to benefit financially from how the rules are shaped. This 
encourages beneficiaries to lobby to change the rules even further in their favour. Classes of agents 
(such as patent attorneys) grow up to argue which side of the regulatory boundary their client should be 
on. These agents also develop vested interests. In the USA they persuaded Congress to drop a proposal 
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to investigate the real-world impact of granting patents for business methods.51 The consequent risk of 
regulatory capture creates a vicious cycle favouring sectional interests rather than the public good. The 
patent system is an excellent example of this. The patent system has developed into a complex legalistic 
system where even those meant to uphold the law openly undermine it. "Swiss medical claims" are 
named after the patent office which designed them (Thambisetty 2009: 16-17).  
There is no tradition of proper oversight of the activities of patent offices from a competition 
perspective. Patent offices are usually located in industry portfolios making them particularly 
susceptibility to regulatory capture. Formal statements from patent offices suggest they do not see 
consumers or non-patenting innovators among their "stakeholders". Several well-informed students of 
the patent system suggest that patent offices have become part of an in-grown self-reinforcing 
community impervious to (and generally unaware of) the evidence as to possible negative impacts from 
the current "strong"52 system (Thambisetty 2009; Drahos 2010). To offset these continuing pressures 
patent systems need clear built-in systems for effective oversight, including audit and evaluation.  
Introducing clear stated objectives into patent statutes (Section 3) will assist in improving transparency 
and accountability, provided these are properly designed and make clear the goals and balances needed 
to achieve positive economic outcomes. Without these it is not surprising that an inward-focussed 
community can head in an economically dysfunctional direction.  
Complexity needs to be substantially reduced. This would open the system to proper democratic 
oversight and minimise room for strategic games. The patent bargain is simple – a patent should only be 
granted for a technological invention which has substantial spillover benefits and where R&D costs are 
large and lumpy. Eliminating the current complex obviousness rules – and replacing these with the right 
question, "is it inventive?" – will go a long way towards implementing this (Section 5). So too will use of 
simple modern words such as technology and allowable existing knowledge. At a system level it would 
be useful to return to the original language used to describe the privileges granted by a patent. They are 
not rights. Nor are they property. They are privileges designed to induce a higher level of investment in 
genuine R&D.53  
Collect data on the impact of patents 
An entirely unacceptable aspect of patent systems, given that they have been a tool of economic policy 
for several hundred years, is the lack of appropriate data on patent use and patent costs for improving 
the design of patent policy. There have been recommendations to collect such data but these have rarely 
been implemented.54 Indeed there are suggestions that well-organised beneficiaries of a "stronger" 
patent system have actively undermined such proposals.55 It seems quite extraordinary that 
governments hand out thousands of monopolies yet collect no data on their use.56  
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Little of the reams of data on patent applications provided by patent offices is useful for policy purposes. 
None give any insight into how the granted monopolies are used.57 It would be a very simple 
administrative procedure – virtually tick-a-box – to require at least some data on use as patents are 
renewed. While this might be onerous for companies who own many thousands of patents,58 if the 
system is to be based on evidence rather than myth, then such data are essential. An alternative which 
would be cheaper for frequent patenters, though it might disclose more information, would be to 
require advice to the patent office before any legal action was taken to enforce a patent. 
The leaked IP chapter requires, in Article 12(2), promotion of "the collection and analysis of statistical 
data and other relevant information concerning intellectual property rights infringements as well as the 
collection of information on best practices to prevent and combat infringements."59 This is very one-
sided and again points directly to the authorship of this text – although it was presented by a 
government it was clearly drafted by patent-holders and shows none of the balance one expects from 
government text. What we desperately need are proper data on patent use and the costs of this use. 
Infringement is a minor issue in comparison. 
Patent Offices should require simple data on how patents are being used as a condition of 
renewal. This should include data on any formal use of the patent in legal proceedings 
(including solicitor's letters) 
Despite the lack of policy-relevant data from the patent system, there are substantial data from surveys 
of industrial innovation and these throw considerable light on the role and importance (or lack 
therefore) of the patent system. These are well reviewed elsewhere (López 2009). What is surprising is 
that National Innovation Surveys do not fully replicate the questions asked in the Yale and Carnegie-
Mellon surveys. Nor do they thoroughly build on that body of work. One critically important omission is 
data on how innovating firms are affected by the patents that other people own. The issues of blocking 
and hold-up patents are widely understood to be important policy questions. Yet we collect no data. And 
although we know a tiny percentage of patents provide the vast bulk of returns we do not, for example, 
have good empirical data on the costs and returns from pharmaceutical patents.60 Another important 
omission is data on the cost of copying. Mansfield and colleagues (1981) did the initial empirical work on 
this issue and it was replicated in the Yale survey (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter 1987). Since then 
there has been no new empirical work despite the importance of the cost and speed of copying as a 
motivating factor for the patent intervention. This is unfortunate as new technologies (such as computer-
aided manufacture, computer-aided design, "maker"61 technology and 3-D printing) and new economic 
players (China, India) may have changed the time and price of copying. 
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Develop new questions for National (Community) Innovation Surveys to directly address 
issues relevant to the role of patents in promoting technological innovation. In particular 
address issues of technological hold-up or diversion, the costs of defensive patenting and 
the speed and cost of imitation. 
Regular audit and periodic evaluation 
The patent system seems to have had a remarkable ability to escape review, evaluation or audit since 
the US Senate enquiry of 1958. This is despite the trend towards greater evaluation of government 
programs across all beneficiary groups. One reason for this is that it is not an budget-funded (outlays) 
program. Like tariff barriers, the costs are distributed across the economy. But unlike tariffs, the costs 
are not readily amenable to quantification, and relevant data are difficult to obtain.  
The development from the mid-1980s of a "stakeholder" culture was intended to increase the sensitivity 
and responsiveness of government agencies to the groups affected by their actions. Unfortunately this 
reform has simply embedded regulatory capture, with revolving doors between patent offices, patent 
attorney firms and frequent users of the patent system. The patent community – patent offices, patent 
attorneys and frequent patenters – has developed into an isolated cultural community unaware of the 
broader research and findings on industrial innovation.62 But governments have a responsibility to the 
whole nation. Breaking this inward-looking culture could readily be achieved by moving patent offices 
from industry or legal portfolios to agencies charged with promoting competition. This would ensure that 
the "stakeholder" definition was broadened to include, at a minimum, consumer interests and 
competitive voices (for example the generics medicine industry).  
In countries new to patenting, where the bulk of the applications are for pharmaceutical products or 
processes, relevant competition and public interest issues will most likely be handled by the health 
ministry. In such situations the objectives of ensuring balance between the incentive and competition 
elements of patent systems might best be achieved by locating patent offices in the ministry of health.  
Locate patent offices in departments which are responsible for maintaining competition in 
the economy or considering public impact aspects relevant to the grant of patents.  
Where advisory groups exist these should fully represent consumer interests and the 
interests of innovating firms negatively impacted by patents. 
Regular economic evaluation would further strengthen a more balanced approach to the grant of patent 
privileges. This would need to be undertaken by economists independent of the patent system and its 
beneficiaries. Organisations such as the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) are precisely the 
kind of independent bodies that should be charged with such evaluations. It was however precisely this 
independence – phrased as "they are not properly qualified" – which led to the American patent bar 
lobbying to prevent the GAO from being mandated to undertake a study of business method patenting.63 
Any attempt to set up an independent evaluation of any part of the patent system immediately leads to 
cries of lack of representativeness. For example the Australian Federation of Intellectual Property 
Attorneys of Australia (FICPI) took issue with balance of the independent panel established to review the 
pharmaceutical patent system in Australia in late 2012, as "there is no representative on the panel who 
is representative of the interests of the innovation based pharmaceutical industry."64 Yet when 
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determining regulatory policy a fundamental issue is that "one must look further afield than those 
involved in and regulating an industry when canvassing opinions regarding changes in public policy" 
(Beggs 1981, p.44). It is precisely this requirement for independence that the "stakeholder" groups do 
not understand.  
There is a place for sectional interests to lobby elected governments, but it should not extend to 
preventing the type of independent review and evaluation that forms the basis for sound public debate. 
As well as regular evaluation there should also be a system for independently auditing the inventiveness 
standard being implemented by the patent office. As discussed above the incentives to ensure 
independent review of possibly erroneous decisions are weak. Further, in at least some countries, judges 
have shown themselves to be poor defendants of the public interest in patent systems. Periodic 
independent review of applications in specific fields (including both grants and borderline rejections) by 
experts would do much to ensure that the new higher standards were maintained. 
Undertake periodic independent economic evaluation of patent policy outcomes and the 
net impact on the economy; 
Undertake a regular program of review of patent office decisions by experts in particular 
technology fields 
9. Conclusions 
These proposals are put forward as policy standards designed to ensure that patent systems do what 
they are intended to do – encourage technological invention that would not otherwise take place. They 
are also designed to ensure that patent systems provide benefits to users of technology and discourage 
rent-seeking behaviours. They are placed on the table to encourage debate and discussion about the 
fundamental principles needed to ensure patent systems enhance rather than reduce national economic 
welfare.  
Since their earliest days international treaties on patents have been largely drafted with the interests of 
large business in mind. This has been most obvious with TRIPS and the later TRIPS-Plus treaties. These 
treaties have created substantial problems for civil society and indeed for sovereign governments. 
Particular concerns have been raised by the health sector.65 
The objective in this paper has been to identify a set of minimum standards which more closely reflect 
the interests of technology-importing economies, many of which are also developing economies. In such 
countries the imbalance of TRIPS and TRIPS-Plus rules are clear. There are few protections against rorting 
the patent system. Where national innovation capacity is low, this simply leads to transfers from 
consumers to foreign companies with no offsetting benefits. Foreign companies are able to acquire 
domestic monopolies without there being any commensurate spillovers benefits to domestically-located 
firms. These revenues assist in transfer pricing allowing local subsidiaries of such companies to avoid 
paying a fair share of domestic taxation. 
Some one hundred years ago, when today's high income countries were developing, patents were far 
less frequently granted, were limited to genuine technological inventions and required more substantial 
inventiveness. They had a far less deadening effect on local innovation. It is ironic that as the pace of 
innovation has increased, and innovation has become a normal part of commercial life, the standards 
required to obtain a monopoly for such innovation have fallen to very low levels. Apart from the injustice 
of forcing this neo-colonial set of regulatory rules on others, the TRIPS deal also appears to have been a 
Faustian bargain. In exchange for agreeing to these regulatory interventions to reduce competition and 
restrain trade developing nations expected to achieve better market access in agriculture and textiles 
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and an end to "punitive measures under the U.S. Trade Act Section 301" (Scherer 2006: 39). The former 
were very slow in coming and the latter has still not occurred.  
The proposals set out in this paper are made from an economic perspective. They are based on the view 
that patents form an important part of innovation policy, being designed to draw resources into 
technological innovation. A further major assumption is that only where the induced innovation creates 
spillover benefits larger than the costs of the reduced competition should a patent be granted. Unless a 
patent system delivers on these two criteria it will act to reduce economic welfare in any economy. As 
most patents in technology-exporting nations are held by overseas entities (for example some 92 per 
cent of patents granted annually in Australia) such a patent system will be a major impost on the current 
account balance and is unlikely to contribute anything to the development of domestic industrial 
capacity. Patent grants in Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are largely owned by non-resident 
entities (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1  Proportion of granted patents owned by non-residents, 1997 to 2011 
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In the immediate post-TRIPS environment the EPO has played a large role in assisting economies new to 
the patenting world to establish patent offices. In doing this they have transferred mental models 
appropriate to European economies. Drahos considers that overseas aid in establishing local patent 
offices has integrated them "into a system of international patent administration in which the grant of 
low-quality patents by major patent offices is a daily occurrence" (Drahos 2007b: 4). Drahos queries 
whether this model serves the interests of developing economies. But there is no off-the-shelf patent 
model that does serve the interests of developing economies – or even of technology-importing 
developed economies such as Australia, New Zealand or Singapore. This paper is a first step in doing this.  
In summary the suggested position on patent policy for a developing economy is that the first-best 
option is that restraints on competition and trade should not be included in "free trade" negotiations. 
Unfortunately this preferred option is now precluded by the outcome of the Uruguay Round. Subsequent 
post-TRIPS "trade" treaties have further reduced national sovereignty in managing domestic policy to 
support innovation.  
As a second-best approach the set of principles outlined here would protect developing economies from 
the worst effects of importing the dysfunctional patent systems currently in use in jurisdictions such as 
the USA, Australia and Europe. While the principal need for reform is in the critical areas of inventiveness 
and technology, no reform package will succeed unless it also addresses the substantial gaming 
behaviour encouraged by the current system. If the focus on semantics rather than substance is not 
addressed then other reforms will fail, for the very reasons the current system has become so 
unbalanced. Because patent policy is delivered through courts and quasi-courts it may become necessary 
to introduce additional elements to monitor court compliance with parliamentary objectives.  
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The following components are designed to achieve a targeted, balanced system which maximises the 
incentive to invest in genuine R&D while minimising the negative effects on innovation, competition and 
public welfare:  
• A clear objectives statement that focuses solely on the economic goals and balances;  
• Limitation to areas of technology (to proxy large lumpy development costs); 
• Countries should be free to set a high inventiveness requirement 
→ no patents for new combinations or uses of known elements;  
• Presumptions should favour the public interest, with applicants being required to 
demonstrate why a patent should be granted; 
• System-wide processes to reduce complexity and strategic gaming to ensure patent 
policy cannot be undermined (including abandoning archaic language); 
• Infringement penalties to align with policy goals  
→ minimise collateral damage; no criminal penalties;  
• Recovery of all profits where patents are found invalid;  
• Collection of data that will assist in evaluating patent policy; and 
• General oversight, audit and evaluation provisions. 
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